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What constitutes a moral judgement as a moral judgement? From the 
popular press to the most staid academic circles, this question will provoke 
lively discussion. Unfortunately, such discourse often gives rise to more 
heat than light. This essay treats one of the more enlightening 
philosophical debates in recent decades on the answer to that question, an 
exchange that focused on R. M. Hare's view of the universalizability of 
moral judgements as articulated in his Language of Morals and Freedom and 
Reason. Hare's argument, in this early stage of his work, is important due 
to its emphasis on universalizability within the context of descriptive 
meaning rules and the requirement of prescriptivity for moral judgements. 
His treatment of the logic of moral discourse is incisive, as it provides a 
coherent approach to the nature of ethics. 
This essay brings Hare into dialogue with his critics Alasdair 
Maclntyre, Don Locke, and Peter Singer, who attack his position at 
foundational points. They ask the most important questions: Must moral 
judgements be universalizable and prescriptive to be truly moral? If so, is 
Hare's position trivial? Does his approach bridge the gap between facts 
and action? 
Through the consideration of these criticisms of Hare, this essay seeks 
to gain a critical perspective on Hare's view of universalizability. The 
question addressed throughout this essay is "Of what value is Hare's 
position for understanding the nature of moral judgements?" The explication 
of Hare's argument and the consideration of his critics' positions provide a 
rigorous testing of the claim that moral judgements must be universalizable. 
Hare suggests that universalizability is a characteristic "which is 
common to all judgements which carry descriptive meaning" (1963,10). It 
follows that "any judgement which has descriptive meaning must be 
universalizable, because the descriptive meaning-rules which determine 
this meaning are universal rules" (1963,39). The designation of a judgement 
as universalizable means for Hare "only that it logically commits the 
speaker to making a similar judgement about anything which is exactly 
like the subject of the original judgement or like it in the relevant aspects" 
(1963, 139). He understands singular descriptive judgements to be 
universalizable because they commit "the speaker to the further 
proposition that anything exactly like the subject of the first judgement, or 
like it in the relevant respects, possesses the property attributed to it" in 
the original judgement (1963,12). 
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Moral qualities on Hare's view are "supervenient or consequential 
properties." There must be some descriptive property in virtue of which a 
thing or an action is judged to be good. It does not make sense to say "X is 
exactly like Y in all respects, but X is good and Y is not" (1952,80-81). Hare 
insists that there must be some morally relevant difference between the two 
cases in order to sustain divergent evaluations of them. One must "either 
produce (or admit the existence of) some principle which makes him hold 
different moral opinions about apparently similar cases, or else admit that 
the judgements he is making are not moral ones" (1963,102). 
Hare understands the task of moral questions to be "that of helping us 
to think better about moral questions by exposing the logical structure of the 
language in which this thought is expressed" (1963, v). Hence, "offenses 
against the thesis of universalizability are logical, not moral" (1963, 32). 
The principle of universalizability functions only "to force people to choose 
between judgements which cannot both be asserted without self-
contradiction. And so no moral judgement or principle of substance follows 
from the thesis alone" (1963,32). 
Hare's view of universalizability is illustrated well in his treatment 
of the "debtor-creditor" case. In this case, A is in debt to B, and B is in debt 
to C, and the law stipulates that creditors may exact their debts by having 
their debtors put in prison. When B contemplates the moral judgement "I 
ought to put A into prison because he will not pay me what he owes," he 
realizes that such a judgement entails his accepting the principle "Anyone 
who is in my position ought to put his debtor into prison if he does not pay." 
B now realizes that if he claims that it is the case that he ought to have A 
imprisoned, he would be required by the logic of moral language to affirm 
that C ought to have him (B) imprisoned. Hare comments that, since the 
prescription "C ought to put me into prison" would commit B to accepting the 
singular prescription "Let C put me into prison," B cannot accept his original 
judgement that he (B) ought to have A imprisoned, as he is not willing to 
accept "Let C put me into prison." Such is the case because "ought" is 
understood here as being used both universalizably and prescriptively 
(1963, 90-91). 
Hare thinks that the above case is an instance of the rejection of a 
moral principle because "one of its particular consequences proved 
unacceptable." The case is a paradigmatic example of the task of ethical 
theory, "to test the moral principles that suggest themselves to us by 
following out their consequences and seeing whether we can accept them" 
(1963, 92). In order to make sense of such a case, Hare insists that the facts 
of the case, the logical framework entailed by the use of the word "ought" 
(universalizability and prescriptivity), and the inclinations of B concerning 
what might happen to him or others must be taken into account. Says Hare, 
'These ingredients enable us, not indeed to arrive at an evaluative 
conclusion, but to reject an evaluative proposition" (1963,92-93). 
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It is important to observe that for Hare "the crucial case which leads to 
rejection of the principle can itself be a supposed, not an observed, one." It 
does not have to be case that C would actually do to B what B wants to do to 
A in order for B to refrain from taking action against A. That B fears action 
which C might take against him is irrelevant to Hare's position. What is 
necessary for the strength of the moral argument is that "B should disregard 
the fact that he plays the particular role in the situation that he does, 
without disregarding the inclinations which people have in situations of 
this sort." B's taking into consideration A's interests and inclinations as 
though they were his own is "what turns selfish prudential reasoning into 
moral reasoning." Hence, a certain aptitude for imagination and the 
willingness to use it are also required in moral argument, for the sake of 
enabling one person to give sufficient attention to the inclinations of others 
(1963, 93-94). 
Hare stresses the point that agreement on the meaning of "ought" does 
not entail that the persons who agree on the meaning of the word would 
share necessarily the same moral views. This is the case in that ethics' 
"bearing upon moral questions lies in this, that it makes logically 
impossible certain combinations of moral and other prescriptions"; it does 
not advance substantive moral positions. But despite the fact that it is 
possible for people to disagree on the facts of a case, to have different 
inclinations toward a course of events, or to have divergent imaginative 
capacities, the logic of moral discourse "is an immensely powerful engine for 
producing moral agreement" (1963,97). 
Hare tests the validity of the above "debtor-creditor" argument by 
considering several ways in which a person in B's situation "might seek to 
avoid it." First, Hare considers the maneuvers which would depend on B's 
using the word "ought" in a way that is either not universalizable or not 
prescriptive "at the cost of resigning from the kind of discussion that we 
thought we were having with him" (1963, 95). Were B to use "ought" 
prescriptively but not universalizably, B would claim moral justification for 
putting A into prison while not agreeing that C ought to put B in prison. 
Hare does not think that he and B would be in moral disagreement in this 
situation, as B is advocating no universal principle concerning what ought to 
be done in all cases of this sort. Hare understands B to have violated the 
logic of moral language by ignoring the requirement of universalizability in 
moral judgements. Hence, "he has to abandon the claim that he is justifying 
the action morally, as we understand 'morally'" (1963, 98-99). 
He next considers the case in which B might use "ought" 
universalizably but not prescriptively. Were B refusing to use the term 
prescriptively, "he could assent to the singular prescription 'Let not C put 
me into prison for debt,' and yet assent also to the nonprescriptive moral 
judgement 'C ought to put me into prison for debt'." Consequently his desire 
not to be imprisoned by C would be no obstacle to B's saying that he ought to 
imprison A. Hare also notes that, were B using "ought" nonprcscriptively, 
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the statement '"1 ought to put A into prison for debt' [would] not entail the 
singular prescription 'Let me put A into prison for debt'; the moral judgement 
becomes quite irrelevant to the choice of what to do." In this case, Hare's 
disagreement with B would be only verbal, "because whereas we should be 
dissenting from the universalizable prescription 'B ought to put A into 
prison for debt,' this would not be what B was expressing...B would not, by 
these words, be expressing a prescription at all." B would have violated 
the logic of the use of moral terms (1963,99-100). 
Hare then examines the ways of escape from his treatment of the 
"debtor-creditor" case which involve "refusing to make positive moral 
judgements at all in certain cases," while still using "ought" 
universalizably and prescriptively. By claiming that it is morally 
indifferent whether or not B imprisons A or by refusing to make any moral 
judgement in the matter, B would be able to avoid the force of the moral 
agreement. Hare's argument succeeds only in forcing B "to reject the moral 
judgement 'I ought to imprison A for debt'." It cannot force B to judge morally 
(1963, 101). But such appeals will have force in the case of a person who 
will make positive moral judgements in situations concerning the actions of 
others, but not about his or her own actions, or in some of his or her own 
decisions, but not in others. The logic of moral reasoning, says Hare, will 
make it necessary to ask such a person on what principle the distinctions 
between the different cases are made. The person "must either produce (or 
at least admit the existence of) some principle which makes him hold 
different moral opinions about apparently similar cases, or else admit that 
the judgements he is making are not moral ones." With no morally relevant 
distinction between the cases to justify different moral judgements, the 
person would be in violation of the requirement of universalizability for 
moral judgements (1963,102). 
Hare also notes the possibility that B will be so committed to the 
principle that people who refuse to pay their debts should be imprisoned 
that he will contend that B should have A imprisoned and that C should 
have B imprisoned. The position of such a person, described by Hare as a 
"fanatic," would "render ineffective the appeal to universalized self-
interest which is the foundation of the argument that we have been 
considering." A person who is so committed to such an ideal does not mind 
that his or other people's interests are harmed in the pursuit of the ideal. 
Hare suggests that B would be more likely to affirm an ideal in such a 
fanatical way if his role as a debtor were only hypothetical. But by asking 
B to imagine himself in the situation of the person toward whom an 
undesired action would be taken, "we might bring him to realize that to 
hold his principle involved prescribing that things should be done to him, 
in hypothetical situations, which he could not sincerely prescribe." If such 
were the case, B would not be able to say that he ought to take action 
against A. Nevertheless, there remains the possibility that B would 
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as a fanatic and affirm that B should imprison A and that C should 
imprison B for the sake of principle (1963,103-106). 
Hare thinks that the most likely strategy that someone in B's position 
would employ to escape the conclusion that B ought not imprison A if B is 
not prepared to affirm that C should imprison B is an appeal to the facts of 
the case. Were B to demonstrate that the case of B and A is different in a 
morally relevant way from the case of C and B, B would escape the force of 
the argument. "The difficulty, however, lies in drawing the line between 
those arguments (for morally relevant factors) ...which are legitimate, and 
those which are not." Hare reasons that the fact that no two cases are 
identical in all respects is irrelevant to the argument, "for all we have to do 
is to imagine an identical case in which the roles are reversed." A morally 
relevant difference between cases must refer to "a properly universal 
property," a property that would be at stake in another case in which B 
played the rote of A. Such an argument "will force him to count as morally 
relevant only those properties which he is prepared to allow to be relevant 
even when other people have them." Hare insists that this approach 
eliminates "the attractive kinds of special pleading" concerning why one 
case is different from another that B might employ to avoid the force of the 
argument (1963,106-107). 
Hare suggest that two points of qualification are necessary to sustain 
the validity of above test for proposed morally relevant differences 
between cases. First, when asking B to imagine himself in the place of A, 
the question should be phrased in the form "'What do you say (in propria 
persona) about a hypothetical case in which you are in your victim's 
position?'" By asking "What do you say?" rather than '"what would you 
say...if you were he?'," B is constrained by moral logic to submit to the test 
concerning whether or not "he now holds an opinion about the hypothetical 
case which is inconsistent with his opinion about the actual case." By 
asking "What do you say?," we deprive B of the response that his opinion is 
only hypothetical, not an actual one that he is holding, and therefore 
irrelevant to his decision about how to treat A. Second, Hare stresses that 
he is not maintaining that B ought not to imprison A simply because B does 
not want to be imprisoned by C. Such a formulation would violate Hare's 
understanding of the impossibility of deriving an "ought" from an "is." 
Hare's "point is, rather, that because of his ad version to its being done to 
him in the hypothetical case, he should not accept the singular 
prescription that in the hypothetical case it should be done to him, and 
this, because of the logic of 'ought,' precludes him from accepting the moral 
judgement that he ought to do likewise to another in the actual case." 
Hare's argument is one of moral logic: As B, given his inclinations, cannot 
assent sincerely to a particular singular prescription, he cannot assent to a 
universal prescription that entails that singular prescription. "Because of 
this entailment, if he assented to the factual statements I of a easel and to 
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the universal prescription, but refused...to assent to the singular 
prescription, he would be guilty of a logical inconsistency" (1963,108-109). 
Hare understands the relationship between a person's inclinations and 
his or her prescriptions to be such that a person cannot sincerely say that he 
or she loathes imprisonment more than anything else in the world and at 
the same time sincerely say '"Let me be put into prison'." An assent to such a 
prescription would be logically possible only if the person's inclinations 
had changed. But such inclinations may very well change, as it is logically 
possible for a person to be a "fanatic," to employ his or her freedom to 
prescribe "Let me be imprisoned" or "Let me be executed" for the sake of 
some principle or ideal (1963,110-111). 
Now that I have described Hare's view, it is time to give consideration 
to his critics. The first critic, Alasdair Maclntyre, asserts that Hare has 
unjustifiably made the logic of a particular moral stance the logic of 
morality qua morality. In "What Morality Is Not," he challenges Hare's 
claim that moral judgements must be universalizable and prescriptive. To 
argue against the requirement of universalizability, he cites Sartre's 
example of the young French pupil during World War II who had to chose 
between leaving France to serve under de Gaulle or remaining at home to 
care for his mother. Sartre used the example to argue that the student 
might decide on one course of action while allowing that others in similar 
situations might choose differently without blame. Maclntyre asserts that 
Hare's insistence on the universalizability of moral judgements draws "a 
line around one area of moral utterance and behaviour and restrict(s) the 
term to that area" in such a fashion that Sarte's non-universalized moral 
judgements are ruled out of the moral sphere. Hence, Maclntyre argues that 
only some, not all, moral judgements are universalizable. He indicates that 
it is entirely possible for someone to make the statement " i ought to abstain 
from participation in war, but 1 cannot criticize or condemn responsible non-
pacifists'" as a moral judgement. Such a person might be refusing to 
legislate for other precisely on moral grounds. To insist, says Maclntyre, 
that all moral judgements must be universalizable is to advance a thesis 
that "can only be maintained by an a priori and quite unjustifiable 
restriction upon the word 'moral'." 
Another example offered by Maclntyre in support of his argument is the 
theological notion of "works of supererogation," deeds of moral heroism 
that go beyond what is required by universalizable moral maxims. 'To say 
of a man that he did his duty in performing a work of supererogation is to 
contradict oneself on Maclntyre's view, as supererogation refers to a realm 
of moral stringency to which it is not incumbent on anyone to adhere. He 
comments on Captain Oates' final, self-sacrificial trek into the snow that it 
does not "make sense to assert that Captain Oates did what he ought to 
have done." Works of supererogation, for him, do not entail a sort of moral 
logic that requires universalizability (326-328). 
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The main thrust of Maclntyre's argument throughout the essay is that 
the requirement of universalizability is entailed by a certain sort of 
morality, but that such a requirement is not a logical requirement for all 
moral reasoning. Says Maclntyre of the argument for a standard of 
universalizability to ensure consistency between espoused moral principles 
and particular judgements, "We blame a man for moral inconsistency 
perhaps, but we do not find what he says meaningless." Rather than a 
requirement of logic, Maclntyre finds the notion of universalizability to be 
an embodiment of the liberal political requirement that "everyone shall be 
judged by the same standard" with impartiality as concerns the person 
whose action is in question. Maclntyre claims "It is not part of the meaning 
of 'morality' tout court that moral evaluations are universalizable, but 
liberals tend to use the word 'morality' in such a way that this is made part 
of its meaning" (332-333). 
Maclntyre concludes the article with an argument that, while it is 
often helpful to begin reflection on a particular moral question with the 
question '"What ought someone like me to do in this kind of situation'," in 
complex situations phrases "like 'someone like me' or 'this kind of 
situation' become vacuous." Maclntyre seems to suggest that in situations in 
which a person finds himself or herself committed to contradictory moral 
maxims, it is impossible to choose a course of action according to what a 
similarly perplexed hypothetical person would choose in a similarly 
confusing hypothetical situation. The implication of Maclntyre's position 
is that a moral judgement made concerning such a situation would not 
necessarily be universalizable (335). 
Don Locke, the second critic whom we will consider, argues in "The 
Triviality of Universalizability," that Hare's formulation of the 
universalizability of moral judgements "seems to collapse into the 
shattering triviality that cases are alike, morally or in any other respect, 
unless they are different" (25). Locke recognizes that Hare's view of 
universalizability is a logical consequence of his claim that moral 
judgements possess descriptive meaning. But he thinks it trivial to assert 
that there is some quality of a thing in virtue of which it will be good, bad, 
or something else: "What follows from the fact that this is good is only 
that all things which are X are good, where being X logically entails being 
good" (28). 
Locke treats Sartre's example of the French student to display the fact 
that Hare's approach entails that the student, in saying that he "ought" to 
do X, "must be legislating for everyone; if he had decided that the reasons 
for joining the Free French outweigh the reasons for staying with his 
mother, then he had decided that they do so no matter who is placed in his 
situation." He demonstrates that Maclntyre's argument, that the point of 
the Sartre example is that the student may decide that he "ought" to do X 
without blaming someone else in a similar situation for not doing X, misses 
the issue in question. Locke thinks that it is possible for the student tosay 
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"As I ought to do X, I judge it wrong for Louis to do Y in a similar situation, 
but I do not blame him for his decision. It is certainly understandable that 
Louis would do Y, and he is within his rights to do so, but I still think it 
wrong" (31). 
Locke also demonstrates that, were Sartre's student to say '"1 believe 
that 1 ought to join the Free French but if, in a situation like mine, you 
sincerely believe that you ought to stay with your mother, then that is 
what you ought to do-you ought to act differently, even though your 
situation is the same as mine'," he would not be in violation of Hare's 
universalizability requirement, as there is a reason in both cases for either 
staying or leaving. 'The claim is not that if I ought to do X then there is 
some reason why anyone ought to do X (Principle of Sufficient Reason), such 
that anyone else to whom that reason applies ought also to do X (logical 
consistency)." Locke provides the further example of someone who thinks 
that he "ought" to see a production of Hamlet because he thinks that he 
will enjoy the performance. He reasons that, on Hare's view, the person 
who thinks that he "ought" to see Hamlet is committed to the proposition 
that anyone in relevantly similar circumstances who would enjoy the 
performance ought as well to see it. Comments Locke in describing Hare's 
view, "A reason is a reason for anyone for whom it is a reason, but this is not 
to say what is obviously false, that a reason for one person is a reason for 
anyone, that all reasons apply equally to everyone" (32). Locke thinks that 
Hare's argument serves to establish only that if D ought to be done in virtue 
of reason Y, then A, B, and C ought to be done to the extent that Y is 
applicable to one or more of them. But Hare, for Locke, "has not established 
that different people ought in the same situations to do the same thing, for 
the fact that they are different people might mean that the reasons which 
apply to them are different" due to their inclinations, beliefs, or desires 
(33-34). 
Locke agrees with Maclntyre that Hare's insistence on the 
universalizability of moral judgements is not part of the logic of morality 
but a particular view of morality that is undergirded by the claim that "we 
ought not to make exceptions in our own favor" in moral judgements. Locke 
provides the example of someone who believes in the divine right of kings: 
a right which applies only to one person at a time. He argues that an 
affirmation of rule by divine right is 'a moral principle which makes an 
exception of a particular individual—here is a principle...which does not 
seem to be universal" (37). The advocate of monarchial rule by divine right 
would affirm that the reason for the monarch's power is that the king is 
given the power by Cod, and that anyone to whom such power is given ought 
to reign. But such a reason, Locke points out, applies to only one person. 
"Inasmuch as there is only one king,...these principles precisely do make 
exceptions of particular people." 
Locke gets to the crux of the matter with his argument that for Hare, 
while moral judgements presuppose reasons, Hare sets no limit on what can 
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be understood as a reason. "All that the argument has shown is that if I 
believe that I am morally privileged, then I must be able to offer reasons 
why I am thus privileged." He thinks that Hare's response to his charge 
would be that reason X (say, "My name is Nimrod Q. Poindexter. I should 
rule because I assent to the universal prescription 'Persons named Nimrod Q. 
Poindexter ought to rule'.") is not morally relevant for distinguishing 
between similar cases. Retorts Locke, "to say this is to import a moral 
element into an argument supposed to be purely logical. All that is required 
by logic is that I offer some reason; whether you find my reason morally 
acceptable is neither here nor there" (38-39). On Locke's view, it is false to 
claim that all moral principles apply to everyone, for Nimrod's claim does 
not apply to people named Obadiah, and it is trivial to assert that a moral 
principle applies to those who are within its realm of application. Hare's 
difficulty, for Locke, is that he takes it for granted that moral principles 
apply to all people irrespective of who they are without demonstrating 
how this is the case. 'This would be correct only if it were true that moral 
principles cannot contain references to particular items and 
individuals...But this...is precisely what Hare does not establish" (39). 
Locke's final objection is to Hare's claim "that it is always possible to 
construct at least a hypothetical case in which the moral principles in 
question apply to the person who was originally applying them to someone 
else" as in the "debtor-creditor" case. Locke insists that Hare's approach is 
faulty in that it ignores the fact that it is impossible to apply a moral 
principle to someone to whom it does not apply, and that not all moral 
principles are even hypothetically applicable to those making the 
judgements. He considers C. C. W. Taylors example of the white South 
African who would be asked by Hare to place himself in the situation of a 
black South African to test the validity of his claim that blacks should be 
governed by whites. Locke cites the case of the white South African as an 
example of the fact that it is impossible for one person to become another, to 
imagine oneself as being fully in his or her situation with his or her 
background, inclinations, etc... As one person cannot take another's position 
in a meaningful way in many instances, Locke rejects Hare's 
universalization test from the "debtor-creditor" case (42). 
Peter Singer, our third critic, considers, in 'The Triviality of the 
Debate over 'Is-Ought' and the Definition of 'Moral'," the advantages of 
universal prescriptivism over descriptivism and "neutralism," the view 
that there is complete neutrality about the form and content of moral 
principles such that there are no limits on what may be affirmed as a moral 
principle. He understands the universalizability requirement to be useful 
for distinguishing between "the principles on which people might act" to 
determine "which are not moral principles." Singer cites the case of Jack 
and Bill who are discussing the merits of spending money on luxuries for 
themselves or on feeding the starving. Bill is brought by the 
universalization test to recognize that the prescription "I ought to spend 
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money on luxuries and not on feeding the starving" is not acceptable to him 
when he imagines himself as one of the starving. It is possible that this 
test might not change Bill's mind due to principles he might hold concerning 
individual self-sufficiency. But Singer's argument is that, despite the 
unlikely sacrifice for the sake of an ideal, "the universalization argument 
does provide a means of linking moral conclusions with statements about 
suffering, happiness, and other matters which may, with some 
reservations, be termed 'factual'." 
He also recognizes the possibility that someone may opt out of morality 
as understood in universal prescriptivism by failing to universalize 
judgements. But what is most important for Singer is his argument that 
universal prescriptivism bridges the gap between morality and action only 
for those who would not be moved by a descriptivist account of, say, 
suffering or happiness, but who will likely be the sort of people who are 
more concerned with moral ideals than with the interests of themselves or 
others. "The person who, because he holds the ideal of 'standing on one's 
own two feet' is able to resist the universalization argument and buy his 
Mercedes while others starve, is just the sort of person who would not be 
prepared to act on moral principles, if 'moral' were defined in terms of 
suffering and happiness, but would be prepared to act on moral principles, 
defined so that they must be universalizable but can have any content" (56). 
Singer thinks that a person who does not hold such moral principles, but 
who is willing to submit to the universalization test, would be just as easily 
moved to act on moral principles as defined by a descriptivist in terms of 
suffering or happiness as by the universalization argument. 
So the only advantage that universal prescriptivism has over 
"neutralism" and descriptivism is that "there are some people for whom it 
can show a logical tie between action and morality" in a way that is 
superior to descriptivism. A disadvantage to universal prescriptivism is 
that it cannot provide, for those who are moved to action by it, "a tie 
between reason, or fact, and morality." Nor, on Singer's view, is universal 
prescriptivism superior to neutralism in persuading an egoist to act 
according to universalized principles, as an advocate of universal 
prescriptivism "would have to use the same arguments that a neutralist can 
use to get an egotist (who has opted out of the realm of morality] to take into 
account considerations other than his own interests." Singer concludes the 
article with his claim to have demonstrated "that there are limits to what 
any account of morality can do." He suggests that there is no definition that 
can bridge the gap between facts and action; that no definition of morality 
has a real advantage over other definitions; and that debates over the 
definition of morality and the "is-ought" question "are disputes over words 
which raise no really significant issues" (56). 
Maclntyre, Locke, and Singer have advanced arguments against Hare 
that seem to strike at the very heart of his position of universalizability. I 
will now examine those arguments in detail in an effort to determine what 
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valid critical insight they bring to Hare's view. First, our attention turns to 
Maclntyre, who begins his critique of Hare with the charge that an 
insistence on the universalizability of moral judgements is not, as Hare 
argues, a requirement of the logic of moral language, but rather a particular 
view of morality that finds its source in the fact that Hare is a political 
liberal who believes that persons should be treated impartially. But 
Maclntyre's critique does not harm Hare's argument, as he never attacks 
that which undergirds universalizability: the claim that moral judgements 
have descriptive meaning as they are evaluative judgements that are 
supervenient on descriptive properties. Since all judgements that possess 
descriptive meaning are universalizable, it follows that moral judgements, 
which possess descriptive meaning, are universalizable. Were Maclntyre 
to formulate an argument against this view of supervenience, he might be 
able to demonstrate inadequacies in how Hare formulates his view. But as 
he does no more than to assert, in effect, "Morality might be understood 
differently by someone else," his argument carries little weight. Also it is 
not the case that Hare's position surreptitiously underwrites liberal 
political morality, as Hare's is a formal claim about the logic of moral 
language which may be appropriated by dedicated monarchists, Nazis, or 
anyone else who is willing to affirm that he or she would accept a 
disadvantaged position for the sake of principle. 
A second attack that Maclntyre makes on Hare is that many moral 
judgements, such as those resulting in acts of supererogation, are by 
definition not universalizable. But what Maclntyre fails to see is that the 
person who decides to undertake such an act on the grounds that "I ought to 
do X" is constrained by the logic of "ought" on Hare's terms to affirm also "I 
think that anyone in a situation that is similar to mine in morally relevant 
respects ought to do X." Maclntyre does not provide convincing reasons that 
people may use "ought" in such a fashion that it is not universalizable 
simply due to the traditional theological category of works of 
supererogation. As he does not engage critically Hare's formulation of 
universalizability via the supervenience of moral judgements on descriptive 
properties, Maclntyre does not build a case against Hare that is sufficient to 
sustain his argument on supererogation. In other words, why should we 
think that Captain Oates had to use "ought" in "I ought to freeze to death 
for the sake of others given the particulars of my situation" in a way that is 
different from the use of "ought" in "I ought not to commit murder"? 
Maclntyre does not provide a convincing answer. 
Maclntyre also argues that it is impossible to place oneself even 
hypothetically in the situation of another, and that in complex situations 
it does no good to ask what someone else would do in a similar circumstance. 
Hence, he concludes that Hare's universalizability thesis is not helpful in 
moral discernment. But Maclntyre fails to see that Hare is not suggesting 
that A decide what to do in situation X as though A were really B. On the 
contrary. Hare understands universalizability as a criterion for moral 
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judgements to help A identify the morally relevant aspects of a situation so 
that A will judge in a manner that is consistent with moral logic. The test of 
universalizability requires imagining that one is in the situation of someone 
else for the purpose of determining whether one is willing to prescribe 
universally the relevant moral judgement. If one finds that one is not 
willing to prescribe such a judgement universally, which would entail 
prescribing it with reference to oneself in a hypothetical situation, one is 
prevented by moral logic from carrying out the judgement against another. 
Hare neither suggests nor requires the translation of one person wholly into 
another for the sake of sound moral judgement. As Maclntyre fails to see 
how universalizability functions for Hare, his critique is not forceful. 
Now let us examine the views of Locke, who argues that Hare's view of 
universalizability requires persons only to give reasons that one situation is 
different from another to justify a different moral evaluation of the 
appropriate action to be taken in the situations, and that such a claim 
establishes merely that people who accept the same reasons are logically 
required to judge similarly. He suggests that Hare has not demonstrated 
that which he thinks Hare is trying to show: that different people ought 
to reach the same universalizable moral conclusions in judgements on similar 
situations. Locke is disturbed that, according to Hare, the particular 
prescriptions of a king to rule by divine right may be universalized. He also 
insists that it does not make sense to apply, even hypothetically, a moral 
judgement to someone to whom it does not apply, such as asking a white 
South African to imagine that he is black. 
These objections by Locke make clear that he fails to take into account 
that Hare is not attempting to demonstrate that people with different 
inclinations and values ought to agree morally. To the contrary, Hare is 
concerned to argue that particular moral agents should make moral 
judgements in such a fashion that they are willing to affirm that others 
who are in situations that are similar to theirs in morally relevant respects 
ought to make the same judgements. In his treatment of the "debtor-
creditor" case, Hare insists that the facts of a case, the logic of moral 
language, and the inclinations of the agent are factors that must be taken 
into consideration, in making moral judgements. Hare does not argue about 
what sorts of inclinations or reasons are morally legitimate; instead, he 
makes a formal case to the effect that agents ought to imagine themselves 
in situations in which their previously affirmed prescriptions apply to 
them, and then ask themselves whether they are inclined to universalize 
the prescriptions or to accept reasons that justify the judgement against 
them. If they are so inclined, they are free to make such universal 
prescriptions. If not, they are required by moral logic to refrain. Locke fails 
to see that Hare proffers the requirement of universalizability as a test for 
guiding agents in making judgements that are in accordance with the logic of 
moral language, not as a method that guarantees agreement or 
praiseworthy moral judgements. 
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Hare's argument does not rest on the claim that a person actually sees 
the moral world through another's eyes in a hypothetical role reversal. 
But it is Hare's position that universalizability requires an agent at least to 
attempt to imagine himself or herself in the situation of the other party. 
Hare acknowledges that the agent, say, an Afrikaner or an absolute ruler, 
might opt out of the universalizability test and hence no longer be making a 
moral judgement. Or such an agent might be a "fanatic" and insist that, 
even if he or she were black or a peasant, that he or she should be ruled by 
others. Hence, Locke's objections do not weaken Hare's position. They serve 
only to highlight the particular sort of universalizability that Hare 
advocates. 
Finally, let us scrutinize the arguments of Singer, who is correct that 
universal prescriptivism does not bridge the gap between "is" and "ought;" 
but that is not Hare's purpose in advancing the case for universalizability. 
More interesting is Singer's claim that universal prescriptivism serves as an 
incentive to action only for those who care more about principles than about 
facts, such as suffering, and that people who are not concerned with moral 
principles would be moved to action just as easily by a descriptive appeal to 
the facts as by the requirement of universalizability. I do not wish to argue 
with Singer's psychological assumptions about motivation, as I do not know 
what to make of them. But even if they are valid, it is still the case that 
Hare's view of universalizability could serve as a guide to persons of both 
sorts to help them in determining what principles or facts they take to be so 
morally relevant that they are willing to incorporate them into universal 
prescriptions. Singer's critique that universal prescriptivism does not tie 
together neatly reason, fact, and morality can also be met with the response 
that the sort of moral self-criticism that the requirement of 
universalizability entails can guide agents in such a fashion that they will 
formulate reasons more responsibly, interpret the facts of a case more 
sensitively, and undertake moral reflection in a more consistent manner. 
The critiques of Maclntyre, Locke, and Singer are not persuasive against 
Hare because their arguments do not attack the foundations of his view of 
universalizability, are focused on points which Hare does not claim for his 
formulation, or fail to recognize the role that the requirement of 
universality plays in this thought. As Hare formulates his task, 
universalizability is "a kind of exploration. We are to go about looking for 
moral judgements which we can both accept for our own conduct and 
universalize to cover the conduct of other actual or hypothetical people" 
(1963, 193). Limits are set on the universal prescriptions that people are 
willing to affirm in light of "the desires and inclinations of the human 
race" (1963, 195). Hare allows for the peculiar judgements of the "fanatic" 
and the amoral discourse of the person who will not submit to the logic of 
moral language. Though he does not guarantee that his approach will 
convince the Nazi or the Afrikaner to be moral in any particular way, 
Hare's insistence that "we are logically prohibited from making different 
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moral judgements about two cases, when we cannot adduce any difference 
between cases" is an invitation to moral imagination and consistency that 
will facilitate the moral discernment of those who accept it (1963, 216). 
Seen in this light, Maclntyre, Locke, and Singer should be able to affirm 
Hare's approach as a tool of self-criticism. 
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